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PREFAcE
The G-24 Discussion Paper Series is a collection of research papers prepared 
under the UNCTAD Project of Technical Support to the Intergovernmental Group of 
Twenty-Four on International Monetary Affairs and Development (G-24). The G-24 was 
established in 1971 with a view to increasing the analytical capacity and the negotiating 
strength of the developing countries in discussions and negotiations in the international 
financial institutions. The G-24 is the only formal developing-country grouping within 
the IMF and the World Bank. Its meetings are open to all developing countries. 
The G-24 Project, which is administered by UNCTAD’s Division on Globalization 
and Development Strategies, aims at enhancing the understanding of policy makers in 
developing countries of the complex issues in the international monetary and financial 
system, and at raising awareness outside developing countries of the need to introduce 
a development dimension into the discussion of international financial and institutional 
reform. 
The research papers are discussed among experts and policy makers at the meetings 
of the G-24 Technical Group, and provide inputs to the meetings of the G-24 Ministers 
and Deputies in their preparations for negotiations and discussions in the framework of 
the IMF’s International Monetary and Financial Committee (formerly Interim Committee) 
and the Joint IMF/IBRD Development Committee, as well as in other forums. 
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Abstract
As the world experiences its worst financial crisis since the 1930s, policymakers are increasingly 
calling for a “Bretton Woods II”. This paper argues that officials will need to think more creatively 
and ambitiously about international financial reform than they have done so far if they are to claim 
the mantle of the 1944 Bretton Woods conference. 
The first section of the paper describes how the global financial crisis of the early 1930s generated 
bold thinking about the need to assert public authority more centrally into the realm of international 
finance. This thinking culminated in three sets of proposals discussed during the Bretton Woods 
negotiations which were genuine innovations in global financial governance: (i) those designed to 
regulate international financial markets more tightly, (ii) those designed to address global imbalances, 
and (iii) those designed to promote international development. 
The second section argues that the current crisis is also generating widespread calls for a reassertion 
of public authority in the global financial realm, but the reform agenda put forward by the G20 leaders 
to date has been very cautious by the standards of the Bretton Woods analogy. Policymakers seeking 
to be move beyond this agenda could consider initiatives in each of the three issue areas identified at 
Bretton Woods. Some such initiatives could resurrect some long-forgotten proposals from the time of the 
Bretton Woods negotiations, such as those relating to debt restructuring, heterodox financial advice for 
developing countries, and the role of international cooperation in controlling capital movements. 
At the same time, new kinds of reforms, suited to contemporary economic and political circumstances, 
could also be considered. The contemporary agenda to regulate international financial markets must 
consider new mechanisms and address a broader range of topics than in 1944. The management of 
global imbalances needs to devote more consideration to the reserve currency status of the dollar, 
currency composition of borrowing by developing countries, sovereign wealth funds and the role of 
regional cooperation. The promotion of international development must also address issues raised by 
contemporary international prudential regulatory initiatives. And important to all these topics is the 
need for a broader governance agenda of making international financial institutions – including, but 
not restricted to, the Bretton Woods institutions – more inclusive as well as more open to the principles 
of subsidiarity and regionalism.ix The Contemporary Reform of Global Financial Governance: Implications of and Lessons from the Past
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I.  Introduction
As the world experiences its worst financial 
crisis since the 1930s, there is a widespread sentiment 
that bold innovations in global financial governance 
are needed. Reflecting this mood, many analysts 
have begun to call for a Bretton Woods II, invoking 
the 1944 conference that established the postwar 
international financial order. Even some leaders took 
up the banner during the lead-up to the first G20 
leaders’ summit in November 2008 that was called 
to draw lessons from the crisis and set an agenda for 
global financial reform. The global financial reforms 
endorsed at that Washington meeting, however, did 
not match these ambitions. If they are to claim the 
mantle of Bretton Woods, policymakers will need to 
think more creatively.
This paper suggests that there are, in fact, im-
portant lessons to be learned from the Bretton Woods 
experience for those searching for a more ambitious 
vision. The contemporary relevance of the Bretton 
Woods conference is that policymakers then were 
driven by a similar goal as those today: the desire to 
assert public authority in the realm of international 
finance in the wake of a major international financial 
meltdown. This overall goal culminated in three sets 
of proposals discussed during the Bretton Woods ne-
gotiations which were genuine innovations in global 
financial governance: (i) those designed to regulate 
international financial markets more tightly, (ii) those 
designed to address global economic imbalances, and 
(iii) those designed to promote international devel-
opment. For policymakers seeking to move beyond 
the G20 reform agenda, this paper suggests that the 
three innovations could provide some inspiration at 
this moment. Even a number of the detailed – and often 
long-forgotten – proposed mechanisms to achieve these 
goals may deserve revisiting today, such as those relat-
ing to debt restructuring, heterodox financial advice 
for developing countries, and the role of international 
cooperation in efforts to control capital movements.2 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 55
At the same time, given how the world has 
changed, a Bretton Woods II could not be the same 
as Bretton Woods I. The contemporary agenda to 
regulate international financial markets needs to con-
sider new mechanisms and address a broader range of 
topics than in 1944. The management of global imbal-
ances should devote more consideration to the reserve 
currency status of the dollar, currency composition of 
borrowing by developing countries, sovereign wealth 
funds, and the role of regional cooperation. The 
promotion of international development must also 
address issues raised by contemporary international 
prudential regulatory initiatives. And important to 
all these topics is the need for a broader governance 
agenda of making international financial institutions 
– including, but not restricted to, the Bretton Woods 
institutions – more inclusive as well as more open to 
the principles of subsidiarity and regionalism.
II.  The bretton Woods precedent
The international financial crisis that began in 
2007 is generating a significant backlash against the 
lack of accountability of many private actors in inter-
national financial markets. Left to their own devices, 
global markets appear to have created a mess. After 
the liberalizing and deregulatory trends of the past 
few decades, many analysts and policymakers are 
calling for public authority to be reasserted in the 
international financial arena. 
The architects of Bretton Woods drew a similar 
lesson from the momentous international financial 
crisis of the early 1930s. Before that crisis, the world 
of international finance had been dominated by pri-
vate international financiers as well as central banks, 
most of which were still privately owned at that time. 
Those groups favoured a laissez faire order in which 
financial capital moved freely across borders and 
international payments imbalances were corrected 
by the automatic mechanism of the international gold 
standard. When the system came crashing down in 
the early 1930s, that liberal vision and its supporters 
lost their privileged position in international financial 
politics. If a multilateral financial order was to be 
rebuilt, it was clear that it would need to be one in 
which governments played a more active role.
This view was held particularly strongly by the 
New Dealers from the United States who played the 
lead role in the Bretton Woods negotiations. They 
had blamed the financial crisis and Great Depression 
on the recklessness of private bankers, especially 
the internationally-oriented New York financial 
community. The first years of the New Deal were 
spent asserting greater public control over the United 
States financial system by creating new regulations 
over the markets as well as by bringing the Federal 
Reserve System under tighter public control. Initially, 
Roosevelt and his advisers did not show much inter-
est in redesigning the international financial system. 
But when wartime pressures encouraged ambitious 
thinking about the post-war world order, New Deal 
policymakers began to consider the possibility of 
creating what Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau 
called a “New Deal in international economics” 
(quoted in Van Dormael, 1978: 52). 
With their country likely to emerge from the 
war as the dominant economic power, United States 
policymakers were determined to play a leader-
ship role in rebuilding a multilateral international 
economic order. The closed economic blocs of the 
1930s were believed to have contributed to the 
Great Depression and World War Two. But United 
States policymakers did not want to see a return to 
the classical liberal international economic order of 
the pre-1930s’ era. Instead, they sought to reconcile 
liberal multilateralism with the new interventionist 
economic policies that had been pioneered in the 
New Deal and elsewhere. This objective was shared 
by John Maynard Keynes who had emerged as lead 
policymaker in charge of British planning for the 
post-war world economy during the early 1940s. 
Both Keynes and his American counterpart, Harry 
Dexter White, saw the goal of bringing international 
finance under greater public control as a central 
objective of their blueprints. As Morgenthau put it 
rather dramatically at the Bretton Woods conference, 
the goal was to “drive the usurious money lenders 
from the temple of international finance” and to shift 
power “from London and New York to the United 
States Treasury”, thereby creating “a new concept 
between nations in international finance” (quotes 
from Gardner, 1980: 76). 
What tools did Keynes and White propose for 
bringing public authority more centrally into the 
realm of international finance? Three sets of propos-
als were advanced during the negotiations, each of 
which signalled a major innovation in global financial 
governance. Not every specific idea put forward with-
in each of the three categories ended up in the final 
Agreements. But some of those that were discarded 3 The Contemporary Reform of Global Financial Governance: Implications of and Lessons from the Past
deserve mention, not just to highlight the bold vision 
of the negotiators, but also because they may be use-
ful for ambitious reformers today to revisit. 
A.	 International	financial	regulation
The most dramatic departure from pre-1930s 
norms concerned the treatment of cross-border move-
ments of private financial capital. Although countries 
agreed to make their currencies convertible for current 
account transactions under the Articles of Agreement 
of the newly created International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), they were given the right to control all capital 
movements under Article VI. Capital controls were 
also encouraged by the fact that IMF resources could 
not be used to cover “large or sustained outflows of 
capital” (quoted in Helleiner, 1994: 49). The contrast 
with post-World War I thinking could not have been 
more dramatic. The Brussels International Financial 
Conference of 1920 had passed a resolution con-
demning all barriers to the international movement 
of capital (League of Nations, 1920: 9). Now, an 
international agreement endorsed the use of capital 
controls in a comprehensive and unambiguous man-
ner. As John Maynard Keynes put it: “What used to 
be a heresy is now endorsed as orthodox” (quoted in 
Helleiner, 1994: 25). 
The Bretton Woods architects were under no 
illusions about the difficulties involved in controlling 
financial flows given the fungibility and mobility of 
money. But the seriousness of their commitment was 
made clear in two ways in the IMF charter. First, to 
curtail capital movements, governments were entitled 
to use comprehensive exchange controls in which all 
transactions – capital account and current account 
– could be scrutinized for illegal financial flows (as 
long as payments for current account transactions 
were not restricted). Second, the negotiators also 
endorsed the idea that each government might help 
to enforce the capital controls of other governments. 
During the lead up to the 1944 conference, Keynes 
and White had discussed how this kind of coopera-
tion might involve governments sharing information 
about financial holdings within their countries that 
contravened other countries’ controls or helping for-
eign efforts to repatriate capital through regulations or 
the taxing of foreigners’ holdings. At one point, White 
even suggested that governments could be asked to 
stop inflows of capital that were considered illegal in 
the sending country (Helleiner, 1994: ch. 2). 
These ambitious plans were not designed to 
stop all private financial flows. In fact, the Bretton 
Woods architects strongly welcomed “equilibrat-
ing” private international financial flows and those 
designed for “productive” investment (Helleiner, 
1994: 36). Indeed, they hoped that their overall effort 
to re-establish international currency stability would 
revive these kinds of private flows. But by explic-
itly permitting governments to control all financial 
movements, the IMF’s Articles of Agreements were 
written to give states the maximum freedom to de-
cide which financial movements were desirable and 
which were not. 
The Bretton Woods architects were particularly 
concerned about speculative and “disequilibrating” 
capital movements. There was widespread agreement 
that these movements had severely disrupted efforts 
to stabilize exchange rates in the interwar period. 
Many also feared that their volatility could under-
mine efforts to foster the expansion of international 
trade after the war. Even more important was the 
concern that these cross-border financial flows would 
undermine national policy autonomy. Capital con-
trols were deemed particularly important to enable 
governments to pursue macroeconomic planning. As 
Keynes put it, “In my view the whole management 
of the domestic economy depends upon being free to 
have the appropriate rate of interest without reference 
to rates prevailing elsewhere in the world. Capital 
control is a corollary to this” (quoted in Helleiner, 
1994: 34). The effectiveness of domestic financial 
regulatory structures constructed in many countries 
during the 1930s and 1940s to facilitate industrial 
and microeconomic planning could also be threat-
ened if domestic savers and borrowers had access to 
foreign financial markets. In addition, policymakers 
sought to protect governments from having their 
policy agendas thwarted by capital flight motivated 
by “political reasons” or the desire to evade domestic 
taxes or “the burdens of social legislation” (quoted 
in Helleiner, 1994: 34).
B.	 Public	management	of	global	
imbalances
Policymakers at Bretton Woods also sought 
to assign public authorities a more conscious and 
active role in the management of international eco-
nomic imbalances. The international gold standard 
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because it promised an automatically self-correcting 
international monetary order. In theory (although not 
in actual practice), international imbalances under the 
gold standard were corrected promptly and efficiently 
by market forces, rather than the discretionary behav-
iour of governments. By requiring all countries to fix 
their currencies’ value to the dollar, which in turn 
was convertible into gold, the Bretton Woods confer-
ence appeared to re-establish an international gold 
standard – or to be more precise, a “gold exchange” 
standard or “gold-dollar” standard. But several other 
features of the agreements made it clear that this was 
to be an international monetary order in which public 
authorities played a much more central role.
To begin with, governments were allowed to 
adjust the par value of their currency whenever their 
country was in “fundamental disequilibrium”. Under 
this adjustable peg system, national policymakers 
faced with a balance of payments deficit could sub-
stitute currency devaluation for the automatically 
imposed harsh domestic deflation of the traditional 
gold standard. Currency realignments of up to ten 
per cent from the initial parity were to be approved 
automatically by the IMF, while larger ones required 
its permission. Even in the latter case, the priority 
given to domestic policy autonomy was made clear; 
the Articles of Agreement of the IMF noted that Fund 
“shall not object to a proposed change because of the 
domestic social or political policies of the member 
proposing the change” (Article IV-5). 
Even more significant was the creation of the 
IMF itself. By providing short-term loans to help 
countries finance their temporary balance of pay-
ments deficits, this international public authority 
could soften the kind of external discipline that pri-
vate speculative financial flows and the gold standard 
had imposed (a goal reinforced by the endorsement 
of capital movements). The IMF was also given 
the broader task of promoting global monetary and 
financial cooperation among governments. The most 
important part of this mandate involved encouraging 
countries to change policies that might be generating 
large international economic imbalances. Its lending 
capacity gave it some potential influence over deficit 
countries. But another clause in its charter – the scarce 
currency clause – also provided a means for official 
pressure to come to bear on surplus countries. If the 
Fund’s resources were drawn upon so extensively by 
deficit countries that its ability to supply a surplus 
country’s currency was threatened, the IMF could 
declare that currency “scarce”. Member governments 
would then be permitted to impose temporary restric-
tions on trade with that country. 
These various provisions gave public authorities 
a much more active role in the management of in-
ternational economic imbalances. It was not just that 
national governments were assigned this role, but also 
that an international public authority, the IMF, had 
been created to look out for the global public interest. 
The only existing international financial institution at 
the time was the Bank for International Settlements, 
created in 1930, whose principle mandate had been 
that of addressing war debt and reparations issues 
and whose members were central banks. The IMF, 
by contrast, had a much broader mandate and its 
members were politically-accountable government 
officials.
C.  The new international development vision
The third major innovation embodied in the 
Bretton Woods Agreements was the creation, for the 
first time, of an official international commitment 
to promote the “development” of poorer member 
countries through mechanisms of international fi-
nance. This commitment was outlined most clearly 
in the creation of an international public institution 
with this goal as one of its two central purposes: the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Devel-
opment (IBRD). The conventional view is that the 
Bank’s development mandate “arrived almost by 
accident and played a bit role at Bretton Woods” 
(Kapur, Lewis and Webb, 1997: 68). More generally, 
it is assumed that the Bretton Woods architects had 
little interest in development issues and the concerns 
of poorer countries. As Meier (1984: 9) put it, “the 
political power lay with the United States and Brit-
ain, and from the outset it was apparent that issues 
of development were not to be on the Bretton Woods 
agenda”. This conventional wisdom understates the 
interest in international development issues at the 
time, and has led scholars to overlook a number of 
innovative proposals put forward during the Bretton 
Woods negotiations to make the international finan-
cial system serve poor countries more effectively 
(Helleiner, 2006, 2009c).
To understand the innovative nature of Bret-
ton Woods thinking in this area, it is important 
first to locate the negotiations within the context of 
broader post-war planning. This planning process 5 The Contemporary Reform of Global Financial Governance: Implications of and Lessons from the Past
was launched by Roosevelt’s and Churchill’s 1941 
Atlantic Charter which set out very broad aspira-
tions for all the world’s peoples, aspirations that 
Roosevelt compared to those of the United States 
constitution and the British Magna Carta. One of 
the central commitments in the Atlantic Charter was 
an “assurance that all the men in all the lands may 
live out their lives in freedom from fear and want” 
(quoted in Borgwardt, 2005: 304). The concept of 
guaranteeing “freedom from want” had been devel-
oped earlier that year by Roosevelt and reflected his 
belief that the promotion of the economic security 
of individuals throughout the world would provide 
a crucial foundation for post-war political stability, 
domestically and internationally. In this way, he and 
other United States policymakers sought to “inter-
nationalize” the New Deal and make the promotion 
of development in poorer countries an international 
responsibility for the first time (Borgwardt, 2005; see 
also Staples, 2006).
The earliest phases of United States planning 
for Bretton Woods were strongly influenced by this 
sentiment. In his first draft for the World Bank in 
1942, White suggested that all members should have 
to “subscribe publicly to a ‘Magna Carta of the United 
Nations’” which would constitute “a bill of rights of 
the peoples of the United Nations” that set forth “the 
ideal of freedom for which most of the peoples are 
fighting the aggressor nations and hope they will be 
able to attain and believe they are defending”. As 
White put it, “the inclusion of that provision would 
make clear to the peoples everywhere that these new 
instrumentalities which are being developed go far 
beyond usual commercial considerations and con-
siderations of economic self-interest. They would be 
evidence of the beginning of a truly new order in the 
realm where it has hitherto been most lacking – inter-
national finance” (quoted in Oliver, 1975: 319).
White and other United States officials had, 
in fact, already endorsed the creation of an interna-
tional institution to promote development in poorer 
countries in the context of the United States-Latin 
American relations in 1939–40. As part of the cultiva-
tion of strategic ties with countries in that region, the 
United States officials had worked closely with Latin 
American counterparts to develop a proposal – the 
first of its kind anywhere – for an international bank 
with $100 million in capital funding whose central 
purpose was to promote economic development in 
that region. The top United States policymakers in-
volved in this “Inter-American Bank” initiative saw 
it not just in strategic terms but also as part of the 
broader New Deal “Good Neighbor” policy to correct 
past wrongs in the United States policy vis-à-vis Latin 
America. In the eyes of many New Dealers, these 
wrongs included not just the dollar diplomacy and 
the United States intervention in the region before 
the 1930s, but also Wall Street’s lending practices 
to Latin America which had received widespread 
publicity during the United States Senate hearings 
in the early 1930s. The goal of the IAB, one top 
official noted, was to provide capital that “could be 
made to serve national needs”, and was “following 
the more careful plans of the various governments 
involved with a view to the steady development of 
the country”, rather “the old very speculative forms 
of finance” that were “used to build up some kind of 
rather tyrannous foreign monopoly which the country 
resented” (quoted in Oliver, 1975: 96–97). This New 
Deal desire to counter the power of Wall Street also 
prompted Treasury officials to insist that the IAB be 
government-controlled (Helleiner, 2006). 
Although opposition from isolationists and 
conservatives in the United States Congress as well 
as New York financial interests prevented the IAB 
from being established, the experience of developing 
the proposal had a strong influence on the United 
States policymakers who soon took up the task of 
planning for the post-war international financial or-
der. The first drafts of the IMF and the IBRD in early 
1942 drew very heavily on the IAB precedent and 
inherited its commitment to promoting development 
goals (Helleiner, 2006). The most obvious continu-
ity in this respect was the commitment to provide 
international public funds via the IBRD to support 
the economic development of poorer countries. 
Far from being an accident, the Bank’s mandate to 
promote development was strongly endorsed at the 
time. The commitment to large-scale public interna-
tional development lending was widely shared in the 
United States policymaking circles during the war, 
and reflected a deep distrust of the ability of private 
markets to serve the new development agenda that 
the Roosevelt administration had committed to. In 
addition to doubting the willingness of private inves-
tors to engage in large-scale lending after the war, 
the United States officials did not think profit-driven 
lending would always effectively serve development 
goals (Helleiner, 2009c). 
These sentiments were strongly supported by 
many other delegations to Bretton Woods, particu-
larly those from poorer countries. It is often forgotten 6 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 55
that well over half the countries attending Bretton 
Woods were from non-industrialized regions. Latin 
America was particularly well represented with 19 
of the total 44 delegations at the conference.1 When 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) sug-
gested that the IBRD focus on reconstruction loans 
for war-devastated areas, the Latin American delega-
tions mobilized successfully to insist that the Bank’s 
development mandate have at least equal standing 
(Oliver, 1975: 184, 188). The delegates representing 
still-colonized India (who were both Indian nationals 
and British citizens) also strongly backed the Bank’s 
development function and even pressed for the IMF 
to focus more explicitly on distinct development pri-
orities of poorer countries (Kapur, Lewis and Webb, 
1997: 60; Gold, 1971: 270–276). Strong support for 
the development function of the Bank also came from 
the Chinese delegation (Eckes, 1975: 91). 
There were three other ways in which United 
States policymakers attempted to integrate develop-
ment goals into the post-war international financial 
architecture, each of which has been largely over-
looked by scholars of Bretton Woods despite their 
contemporary relevance. The first relates to the 
problem of capital flight from poor countries. This 
issue had interested United States officials during 
the IAB discussions because Latin American capi-
tal flight to New York had increased considerably 
during the 1930s. To recycle this capital, United 
States policymakers had suggested that the Bank be 
allowed to accept private deposits and issue bonds 
directly to Latin American citizens, thus enabling 
it to become “by reason of its preferred position, a 
popular repository for Latin American funds”. The 
funds could then be re-channelled to the same coun-
tries in the form of public loans for developmental 
purposes in ways that would “assure to each country 
the availability of the savings of its citizens” (quotes 
in Helleiner, 2009c). This and other aspects of the 
IAB prompted New York banks operating in Latin 
America to mobilize strongly against the initiative. 
In his first drafts of the Bretton Woods institutions, 
Harry Dexter White abandoned that specific proposal, 
but retained the commitment to address the capital 
flight issue. In place of recycling the funds via an 
international public institution, he chose instead to 
recommend the control of flight capital, noting that 
the Fund’s endorsement of capital controls would be 
particularly useful to poorer countries for this reason 
(Horsefield, 1969: 67). 
United States policymakers also sought to ad-
dress the question of restructuring the debts of poorer 
countries. The issue had been controversial in United 
States-Latin American relations in the wake of wide-
spread Latin American defaults on external debt in the 
early 1930s. As far back as 1933, some Latin Ameri-
can governments had proposed the creation of an 
international institution that could renegotiate these 
debates in a manner that avoided the kind of heavy-
handed creditor interference of the past. Although the 
Roosevelt administration had little sympathy with 
Wall Street interests, it had been wary of participat-
ing in an international institution that would force it 
to take a position on the resolution of private United 
States debts. This issue reappeared in the late 1930s 
when United States’ financial assistance to the region 
was opposed by financial interests who felt it should 
not go to countries that had not settled their debts 
with United States private lenders. Frustration with 
this opposition prompted some in the United States 
Treasury to suggest that the proposed IAB could 
appoint independent arbiters to force settlements of 
outstanding debts (Helleiner, 2009c). 
White’s first drafts of the Fund and IBRD picked 
up on this proposal. He gave the Fund the ability to 
engage in “compulsory arbitration” by including a 
rule that member governments could not default on 
external loans “without the approval of the Fund” 
(Horsefield, 1969: 44, 71). In the case of the Bank, 
early drafts prevented it from lending to govern-
ments in default on a foreign loan, but an exception 
was made if the government “has agreed to renew 
service of the defaulted debt on a basis worked out by 
a special committee appointed by the Bank for that 
purpose” (quoted in Oliver, 1975: 292). In defending 
these provisions, White openly aired his frustration 
with the fact that United States bondholders had of-
ten blocked initiatives to boost United States public 
lending to countries when they were “not satisfied 
with the terms of adjustment offered by the default-
ing government” (quoted in Oliver, 1975: 303). 
The idea that new post-war international financial 
institutions could assist in debt restructuring found 
support in the United States State Department and 
elsewhere. Ultimately, however, it was withdrawn 
from negotiations, partly because of concerns that it 
might encourage more defaults and partly because 
of Morgenthau’s longstanding opposition to the 
United States Government involvement in any debt-
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The final way that United States policymakers 
attempted to bring development concerns into the 
realm of international finance also did not find its 
way in any formal sense into the final Bretton Woods 
Agreements, but it was influential and widely wel-
comed across Latin America. Beginning in the early 
1940s, the United States Federal Reserve launched 
a set of financial advisory missions to the region 
explicitly intended to signal the new United States 
interest in supporting Latin American development 
objectives. These were not the first financial advisory 
missions the United States had sent to Latin America. 
During the 1920s, the United States economist Edwin 
Kemmerer had led a number of famous “money doc-
toring” missions to the region in which he advocated 
the establishment of independent central banks and 
the gold standard to a number of countries seeking 
to attract New York investment capital. The content 
and style of the Fed missions in the early 1940s were 
entirely different, however. Instead of prescribing or-
thodox gold standard policies, the new United States 
advisors explicitly sought to boost the ability of Latin 
American governments to build more diversified, 
industrialized and inward-focused national econo-
mies by endorsing the use of capital controls, activist 
monetary policy aimed at domestic goals, adjustable 
exchange rate pegs and government-controlled cen-
tral banks (Helleiner, 2009a). 
This “heterodox” advice was in keeping with 
the overall Bretton Woods vision, and the officials 
involved in these missions initially saw their advisory 
work as an activity that the post-war international 
institutions could soon take over. In contrast to 
the Kemmerer missions, United States officials 
also went out of their way to draw upon, and learn 
from, Latin American expert views and experience. 
Latin American Governments during the 1930s had 
already experimented with many of the policies 
that the United States officials now recommended. 
The lead United States official, Robert Triffin, also 
went out of his way to consult extensively with, and 
acknowledge his debt to the ideas of Raúl Prebisch 
who was emerging as a leading Latin American eco-
nomic thinker at this time (Dosman, 2008, Helleiner 
2009a). While Kemmerer’s advice had been almost 
identical in every country, Triffin insisted on adapt-
ing his advice to the distinctiveness of each country’s 
circumstances and needs, and giving very high prior-
ity to the inclusion of the country’s officials in the 
process of developing the reform proposals. He and 
other United States financial advisers also included 
Latin American experts, including Prebisch, on their 
missions and strongly encouraged intra-Latin Ameri-
can exchanges of financial expertise on the grounds 
that Latin American policymakers often could learn 
much more from each other than they could from 
United States officials (Helleiner, 2009a). 
III. What relevance today?
In what ways, if any, is this history of the Bret-
ton Woods experience relevant to the contemporary 
context? As we experience the worst global financial 
crisis since the early 1930s, it is perhaps not surpris-
ing that some similar political reactions are emerging. 
Bankers find themselves under attack, and govern-
ments everywhere are being called upon to reassert 
their authority in global finance. Responding to this 
mood, President Bush convened the G20 leaders’ 
summit in November 2008 with the goal of setting 
an agenda for global financial reform. Analysts, and 
even some leaders, raised expectations that the meet-
ing would be a kind of sequel to Bretton Woods. This 
section compares the agenda for reform endorsed at 
the summit to that of Bretton Woods across the three 
areas outlined above. The comparison reveals how 
cautious the G20 agenda has been so far. But it also 
provides a framework for thinking about how the 
agenda could be made more ambitious, if leaders 
so wished. This is not to suggest that all the specific 
proposals discussed during the Bretton Woods nego-
tiations deserve revisiting. Different circumstances 
today require that policymakers think through prob-
lems considered at Bretton Woods in new ways.
A.	 Widening	the	agenda	of	international	
regulation
The G20 summit agenda focused heavily on the 
question of the regulation of international financial 
markets. But the meaning was quite different than 
at Bretton Woods. In the early 1940s, the focus was 
entirely on enabling states to regulate the interna-
tional movement of financial capital at their borders 
with capital controls if they so wished. International 
financial regulation, in other words, was a synonym 
for curtailing the international capital mobility. 
Today, the phrase has a different meaning. Over 
the past few decades, financial markets around the 
world have become more and more integrated, driven 
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technological and market innovations. In this context, 
policymakers began, from the mid-1970s onwards, to 
construct an increasingly dense international regula-
tory regime that set common standards for national 
regulators in areas ranging from prudential regula-
tion to the control of illicit financial activity. When 
the G20 leaders discuss strengthening international 
financial regulation, they mean tightening various 
provisions of this new international regulatory regime 
– particularly those relating to prudential regulation – 
rather than any new Bretton Woods-style constraints 
on cross-border financial movements.
These initiatives help fill an important gap 
left unaddressed by the Bretton Woods architects. 
Because they did not anticipate the emergence of 
such highly integrated global financial markets, the 
Bretton Woods negotiators devoted no attention to 
the need for international prudential regulation. The 
G20 agenda outlines some important initiatives that 
will fill holes in the existing international regulatory 
framework relating to a wide range of issues involv-
ing banks, credit rating agencies, derivatives markets, 
hedge funds, and accounting practices (Helleiner and 
Pagliari, 2009). The G20 also committed to under-
take a review of the scope of financial regulation as 
a medium-term objective “with a special emphasis 
on institutions, instruments, and markets that are 
currently unregulated, along with ensuring that all 
systemically-important institutions are appropriately 
regulated” (G20, 2008). It is also encouraging that 
the G20 leaders have committed to move beyond 
the usual calls for improved transparency and risk 
management to address the pro-cyclicality of existing 
regulatory frameworks. 
While the G20 leaders are pioneering new 
forms of international prudential regulation, they 
have devoted much less attention to the kinds of 
regulations on cross-border flows that occupied the 
Bretton Woods architects. Rodrik and Subramanian 
(2008) question this neglect. They note that the recent 
financial bubble experienced by the United States was 
exacerbated by large-scale capital inflows in a similar 
way that earlier crises in developing countries – such 
as the debt crisis of the early 1980s and the 1997–98 
crises – were preceded by massive inflows of capital 
which generated bubbles in those countries (see also 
Reinhart and Rogoff, 2008; Wolf, 2008). Given these 
experiences, they argue that an agenda of reducing 
capital mobility could play a role in minimizing 
future international financial crises. Indeed, they 
go further to suggest that this agenda may be more 
important than efforts to strengthen international pru-
dential regulation since the latter will never be able to 
keep up with financial innovation. As they put it, “if 
the risk-taking behaviour of financial intermediaries 
cannot be regulated perfectly, we need to find ways 
of reducing the volume of transactions ... What this 
means is that financial capital should be flowing 
across borders in smaller quantities, so that finance 
is ‘primarily national’, as John Maynard Keynes 
advised” (Rodrik and Subramanian, 2008).
In specific terms, Rodrik (2009) has recom-
mended that developing countries strengthen their 
“counter-cyclical capital-account management”; 
that is, they restrict excessive foreign borrowing in 
good times and control capital flight during crises. 
Although these policies are already permitted under 
the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, Rodrik suggests 
that the IMF should be more active in advising 
on their national implementation (see also South 
Centre, 2008). Rodrik also backs two international 
regulatory proposals that would require developed 
country support. The first was endorsed by the Bret-
ton Woods architects: the sharing of information 
about financial holdings that may contravene other 
countries’ tax laws. Rodrik is particularly concerned 
about how developing country governments have 
trouble gaining accurate information on the deposits 
of their wealthy citizens abroad, but the problem also 
affects developed countries, especially vis-à-vis tax 
havens. A number of international initiatives have 
been launched in recent years to address this issue 
and the G20 leaders endorsed more being done as a 
medium term objective: “lack of transparency and a 
failure to exchange tax information should be vigor-
ously addressed” (G20, 2008). 
The G20 did not, however, endorse the other 
initiative supported by Rodrik: the introduction of a 
Tobin tax. First put forward in the 1970s by Nobel 
laureate James Tobin, this initiative would introduce 
a very small transaction tax (Rodrik suggests 0.25 per 
cent) on all foreign exchange transactions. Tobin’s 
case for the tax paralleled the arguments of the Bret-
ton Woods architects: it would discourage short-term, 
speculative cross-border financial movements that are 
causing socially-disruptive adjustments to trade pat-
terns and exchange rates besides reducing the policy 
autonomy of governments (although the tax would 
be very unlikely to deter sudden withdrawals in the 
event of panic). At the same time, the tax would not 
interfere with more desirable and more productive 
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be quite insignificant as a cost item. In Tobin’s (1978: 
158) famous phrase, the objective is simply to “throw 
some sand in the well-greased wheels” of international 
financial markets. Given the widespread criticism of 
international bankers at the moment, the tax might be 
seen by the general public as an appropriate discipline 
to apply against their past behaviour. Support for the 
tax may also be generated by the fact that it would 
provide considerable revenue – as much as several 
hundred billions of dollars each year – which could 
be used for a variety of public purposes, including 
not just the funding of fiscal deficits at the national 
level, but also international initiatives to address 
development or global environmental issues. 
Opponents of the Tobin tax have been quick to 
dismiss it, arguing that it could never be implemented 
in an effective fashion since it would require the 
cooperation of every country in the world. But this 
overstates the political difficulties involved. The vast 
bulk of foreign exchange trading is concentrated in a 
handful of financial centres because it relies on dense 
networks of information, accounting and legal serv-
ices that exist there in a reliable form. If the tax was 
imposed in those centres, the likelihood of foreign ex-
change trading business fleeing in massive quantities 
to lightly regulated offshore financial centres is low 
(Schmidt, 2007). Even if this flight took place, the 
leading financial centres could threaten jurisdictions 
that did not abide by the tax in various ways. Richard 
Cooper (1994: 141), for example, notes that “it would 
suffice to stipulate that disputes arising over foreign 
exchange transactions could not be adjudicated in 
countries of the leading financial centres unless the 
tax had been paid. Since it takes years to establish a 
reputation for fair and impartial dispute settlements, 
a small tax would be unlikely to drive transactions 
to tax-free countries without such reputations” (see 
also Ul Haq, Grunberg and Kaul, 1996).
B.	 Managing	global	imbalances	in	new	ways
The recent crisis has also raised the question 
of whether public authorities need to take a more 
active role in the management of global imbalances. 
Many analysts blame the crisis at least partly on large 
imbalances that had emerged in recent years, with 
the United States running enormous current account 
deficits funded by capital from surplus countries, 
particularly oil exporters and the most successful East 
Asian exporters (e.g. Wolf, 2008). In the years leading 
up to the crisis, many policymakers were complacent 
about these imbalances because they were financed 
more than adequately by global capital flows. The 
financial crisis has created new concerns about the 
sustainability of such financing. If volatile capital 
flows provoked the need for sudden macroeconomic 
adjustments and currency fluctuations, the resulting 
economic upheavals could be painful. Even if exist-
ing imbalances are sustainable, others worry that they 
will contribute to protectionist pressures, currency 
instability, and international political tensions. Still 
others question the desirability of a world where 
enormous sums of capital flow ‘uphill’ from devel-
oping countries to one of the richest country in the 
world. More generally, if global imbalances played 
a role in contributing to the crisis, many believe their 
management must be part of the current international 
financial reform agenda.
The G20 leaders largely ignored the issue in 
their final summit communiqué in November 2008, 
although it has generated growing acrimony between 
major deficit and surplus countries. Top United States 
officials have blamed surplus countries, especially 
China, for generating the crisis with their excessive 
savings. Chinese officials have responded angrily 
saying “this view is extremely ridiculous and irre-
sponsible and it’s ‘gangster logic’ (quoted in Wolf, 
2009). From the standpoint of many surplus countries, 
excessive United States borrowing and consumption 
as well as macroeconomic indiscipline have been the 
key sources of the global imbalances. 
Is there anything to be learned from Bretton 
Woods to move this debate forward? The Bretton 
Woods principle – that both surplus and deficit 
countries should share responsibility for addressing 
global imbalances – deserves to be reiterated today. 
The specific international public mechanisms needed 
to foster this goal, however, will need to be very dif-
ferent from those put forward at Bretton Woods. The 
BW architects hoped that the IMF could play the key 
role in prompting both deficit and surplus countries to 
undertake adjustments by virtue of its central position 
in the international monetary system. But the IMF has 
little influence in this situation today because the sur-
plus countries’ currencies are not becoming “scarce” 
in the Fund and because the major deficit country, 
the United States, has no intention of borrowing from 
the institution. In this context, the IMF’s recent ef-
forts to encourage cooperation by strengthening the 
multilateral surveillance process are laudable, but 
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Other international mechanisms deserve con-
sideration. Looking first at the United States, the 
international policy problem is the opposite of the one 
that Keynes faced at Bretton Woods. Keynes had wor-
ried about the traditional asymmetry between deficit 
and surplus countries, where the latter faced less im-
mediate market pressures to adjust than the former. 
Today, we are faced with a situation that he did not 
anticipate: the most important deficit country faces 
few constraints. The dollar’s role as world currency 
has enabled the United States to delay adjustments 
as foreigners finance its current account deficits with 
dollar holdings. It is for this reason that a number of 
policymakers have been discussing the possibility of 
scaling back the dollar’s international role as part of 
the international reform agenda. 
The agenda has been given a further push by the 
fact that the dollar’s international position is already 
facing a challenge from the euro. Although scholars 
debate the extent of the challenge, few disagree with 
the view that the dollar’s pre-eminent position will 
be diminished, at least somewhat, by the new Euro-
pean currency in coming years. In the context of 
this challenge and the United States’ own financial 
difficulties, there are concerns about the prospect 
of growing currency instability. International cur-
rencies are sustained in part by a kind of inertia; 
people continue to use a specific currency because 
other people use it. If there was a sudden change 
of expectations, a “tipping point” could be reached 
where foreign support for the dollar’s international 
role could diminish quite quickly. Dollar crises in the 
past – recall 1971, 1978–1979 and 1987 – have been 
associated with worldwide instability. To minimize 
this risk, it would be helpful if a mechanism could 
be developed to enable those governments wishing 
to diversify their reserves away from dollars to do so 
without generating a major dollar crisis. 
Precisely such a mechanism was negotiated 
during1978–80 by the top G5 policy makers, with 
the strong support of United States and IMF officials 
(Gowa, 1984). Under this proposal, foreign govern-
ments would have been allowed to deposit dollars 
in a special “substitution account” at the IMF and 
be credited in certificates denominated in the IMF’s 
currency: SDRs. Because this exchange was off-
market, foreign governments would have been able to 
diversify their assets without undermining the value 
of the United States dollar. Of course, there would 
have been some costs. Although SDRs could be used 
by foreign governments to pay for future balance of 
payments deficits or transfers to other governments, 
assets denominated in this currency are less liquid 
than those in dollars. The account also risked los-
ing money if the dollar fell, since its liabilities were 
denominated in SDRs whereas its assets were dollar-
denominated United States Treasury bills. Efforts to 
shift this exchange rate risk to the IMF – by asking 
the Fund to back the account with its gold holdings 
– ultimately complicated the negotiations. When the 
dollar rose sharply after the United States monetary 
policy tightened dramatically in 1979, the issue left 
the global public policy agenda. 
Proposals for a substitution account deserve to 
be considered again today. Prominent United States 
economists such as Fred Bergsten (2007) – who 
was involved in the 1978–1980 discussions – have 
raised the idea and some analysts suggest that large 
foreign dollar holders such as China might be open to 
discussing it (Reuters, 2008). By boosting the role of 
the SDR, the initiative would work towards Keynes’s 
goal – laid out in his initial Bretton Woods drafts – 
of centring the international monetary system more 
firmly on a supranational form of money. If this multi-
lateral solution proved too difficult to negotiate, Peter 
Kenen (2005) has also suggested that the European 
Central Bank (ECB) could create a special facility that 
bought dollars from other central banks in exchange 
for newly-issued, off-market, euro instruments. This 
proposal would enable the ECB to minimize the risk 
of a dollar sell-off that would generate a further ap-
preciation of the euro. United States and European 
officials could even share the exchange rate risk if 
the Europeans were to exchange some portion of the 
United States Treasury bills they purchase for special 
euro-denominated United States T-bills. 
What about the surplus countries? As Martin 
Wolf (2008) has recently noted, a key reason many 
developing countries have been accumulating such 
large foreign exchange reserves is their fear of finan-
cial crises; more specifically, they seek to insulate 
themselves against a repetition of the kinds of finan-
cial crises experienced in the 1980s and 1990s. Wolf 
argues that the international community could help to 
minimize their fears by encouraging them to borrow 
in domestic currency as a way to minimize currency 
mismatches. He also notes that it would help to make 
debt restructuring easier, a point discussed further 
below. But it is his third solution that would have been 
most familiar to the Bretton Woods architects: reserve 
pooling. If developing countries could be persuaded 
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when needed with minimal conditionality, they would 
feel less compelled to hold such large reserves (at 
considerable financial cost to themselves). 
Unfortunately, that institution’s recent record 
has undermined trust in it among potential borrow-
ers. Policymakers in many developing countries 
have preferred costly self-insurance against balance 
of payments crises rather than reliance on an institu-
tion whose recommendations in the recent past have 
been seen as unhelpful, too intrusive, and/or overly 
influenced by United States and European goals. An 
important step on the road to reducing global imbal-
ances is thus to reform the IMF in a more serious 
manner to regain the trust of developing countries. 
The G20 leaders made a commitment at their No-
vember 2008 summit to advance the reform of the 
Bretton Woods institutions in order that “emerging 
and developing economies, including the poorest 
countries, should have greater voice and representa-
tion” (G20, 2008). Alongside this reform, there needs 
to be a shift in the style and content of the IMF’s 
advice. In this context, Triffin’s money-doctoring 
missions could act as a possible model for rebuilding 
trust in the institution among developing countries. 
These missions were welcomed across Latin America 
because they took seriously the concept of “country 
ownership” and showed openness to a diversity of 
policy approaches (including the kinds of capital 
controls recommended by Rodrik).
Reform of the IMF is important for another 
related reason. In the past, payments surpluses were 
usually recycled to deficit countries via private finan-
cial flows or official purchases of safe, highly liquid 
international reserve assets. In the last few years, in 
order to earn higher returns, many surplus countries 
have begun to move some of their official reserves 
into funds which invest much more aggressively 
in higher-risk assets, ranging from equities to real 
estate. These sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) have 
now become significant players in global financial 
markets and they have generated some political 
concerns in recipient countries about the purposes 
to which such state-run investment vehicles might 
be used. These concerns have led to some calls for 
restrictions on SWF investments, restrictions that 
would not just antagonize surplus countries but also 
inhibit the role that SWFs are playing in recycling 
payments surpluses. 
In order to minimize these reactions, the IMF led 
negotiations to create a set of principles that 26 SWFs 
embraced in October 2008 to guide their investment 
behaviour internationally. But the non-binding and 
vague nature of these “Santiago principles” makes 
them unlikely to satisfy all critics. A more ambitious 
proposal comes from analysts Michael Bordo and 
Harold James (2008) who have wondered whether 
the IMF should take on the role of an active asset 
manager, investing funds on behalf of SWFs, and 
thus minimizing protectionist reactions in recipient 
countries. This proposal once again would obviously 
require significant governance reform at the Fund. 
Bordo and James suggest that as much as fifty percent 
of IMF votes could be determined by the size of reserve 
assets placed in the IMF for this kind of active manage-
ment. This change could even be combined with an 
initiative to encourage SWFs to invest a small portion 
of their funds – World Bank President Robert Zoellick 
has suggested one percent (Guha, 2008) – in projects 
relating to development or other global goals. In this 
way, it might be possible to reinforce the Bretton 
Woods principle that the accumulation of large bal-
ance of payments surpluses should be accompanied 
by certain international responsibilities. 
If surplus countries continued to have misgiv-
ings about the IMF, it may be that other international 
institutions – particularly those at a more regional 
level – could be useful. Already, East Asian countries 
have been expanding regional cooperation of this 
kind through the Chiang Mai Initiative. With the 
largest reserves in the world, the countries in this 
region have the capacity to create a regional reserve 
pooling arrangement that could dwarf the size of the 
IMF. European Union countries are also being called 
upon to take a large role in crisis-lending to Eastern 
European countries. In Latin America, initiatives to 
expand the regional provision of balance of payments 
finance are also being considered. If meaningful IMF 
reform continues to prove politically difficult, these 
regional arrangements are likely to become more 
important. 
This regionalization trend would allow for 
greater pluralism in international financial govern-
ance. The existence of regional development banks 
has long enabled quite regionally distinct approaches 
to development lending. Mistry (1999) argues that the 
case for pluralism may even be stronger in the area 
of balance of payments financing given some of the 
problems that have been associated with the IMF’s 
monopoly in the past. Some might object that this 
trend will undermine the Bretton Woods commitment 
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that the European Payments Union ended up playing 
a very constructive and complementary reserve-
sharing role in the early years of the Bretton Woods 
system. Some supporters of regional institutions, 
such as the South Centre, have even suggested that 
the IMF could emerge in the future “as the apex of a 
network of regional reserve funds – that is, a system 
closer in design to the European Central Bank or 
the Federal Reserve System than to the unique glo-
bal institution it currently is ... A denser network of 
institutions seems better adapted to a heterogeneous 
international community, and it is likely to provide 
better services and give stronger voice to smaller 
countries” (South Centre, 2008: 4).
C.	 Strengthening	development	priorities	in	
international	finance
Finally, what has been the place of develop-
ment issues in the international reform agenda? The 
widening of the G7 to the G20 at the leaders level 
was intended to involve some developing countries in 
setting the agenda. One would then expect develop-
ment issues to assume a more prominent place. The 
G20 communiqué did reaffirm commitments to the 
Millennium Development Goals and the principles of 
the 2002 United Nations Conference on Financing for 
Development in Monterrey, including that of “coun-
try ownership and mobilizing all sources of finance 
for development” (G20, 2008). In addition to the IMF 
and World Bank governance issues already mentioned, 
the G20 leaders also encouraged international financial 
institutions and aid donors to maintain and enhance fi-
nancial support for developing countries. These points 
reiterate some principles embodied in the original 
Bretton Woods development agenda.
Less prominent, however, was development 
content relating to the central issue addressed by 
the November 2008 communiqué: international 
regulatory reform. One very limited reference was a 
“medium-term” goal that “advanced economies, the 
IMF, and other international organizations should 
provide capacity-building programs for emerging 
market economies and developing countries on the 
formulation and the implementation of new major 
regulations, consistent with international standards” 
(G20, 2008). There was, however, a more important 
indirect reference: “The Financial Stability Forum 
(FSF) must expand urgently to a broader member-
ship of emerging economies [by March 31, 2009], 
and other major standard setting bodies should 
promptly review their membership” (G20, 2008). 
The expansion of the FSF is significant because the 
international regulatory agenda has, to date, been led 
by this body whose membership is dominated by the 
G7 countries. The FSF, in turn, has worked closely 
with various standard-setting bodies in which devel-
oping countries have also had minimal voice such as 
the Basel Committee. The G20 leaders’ decision to 
widen membership of the FSF and these other bodies 
should provide developing countries with more op-
portunities to inject “development” content into the 
international regulatory reform agenda. 
Some parts of this agenda involve issues of great 
importance to developing countries such as sharing 
tax information as well as issues on which develop-
ing countries have had quite distinct perspectives in 
recent years, such as the content of Basel II or the 
regulation of hedge funds. Other parts of the regula-
tory reform agenda may raise opportunities to explore 
links between financial regulation and development 
problems that have not received much attention in 
the past. For example, the initiative to bring greater 
order and regulation to derivatives markets may 
provide a chance for developing countries to raise 
questions about the relationship between speculation 
in commodities futures markets and the recent food 
crisis. There is presently no international standard 
for the regulation of commodity futures markets, but 
individual countries have been moving unilaterally to 
tighten regulations and these initiatives may prompt 
the creation of international rules (IATP, 2009).
Are there other international regulatory issues 
that have not been raised at all by the G20 leaders that 
could be put on the agenda? The Tobin tax has been 
mentioned above and it might be particularly attrac-
tive for developing countries if the revenue it raised 
could be used for international development assist-
ance. Another initiative might be Rodrik’s proposal 
for the IMF to take a more active role in encouraging 
counter-cyclical capital account management. The 
Bretton Woods negotiations suggest two additional 
regulatory issues that might be of special interest to 
developing countries – the regulation of debt restruc-
turing and capital flight. 
Regarding the first, it is likely that we will see 
growing external debt problems in the developing 
world as the current global financial crisis continues 
to unfold. It is also unlikely that they will get resolved 
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1990s with high conditionality, large IMF lending. 
Political support for the kind of IMF conditionality 
imposed in those episodes has eroded dramatically 
in debtor countries. And large international bailouts 
are unlikely to be popular in rich countries whose 
citizens have little appetite to support the interests 
of international investors at the moment and whose 
cash-strapped governments may be reluctant to ap-
prove very significant new funding for the IMF. In 
this political context, it is prudent to anticipate the 
prospect of impending defaults and debt restructur-
ing, with the key policy question being whether or 
not they will take place in an orderly fashion. 
The case for creating an orderly multilateral 
mechanism for facilitating debt restructuring parallels 
that for domestic bankruptcy rules. Because sover-
eign debt crises can be caused, or at least exacerbated, 
by “rushes to the exit” in the form of capital flight, 
the international legitimization of a standstill on 
payments in these circumstances would be helpful to 
debtors and private creditors alike. Once crises have 
broken out, the resolution of sovereign debt crises 
has also often been a messy and time-consuming af-
fair that has been damaging to the interests of both 
private creditors and sovereign debtors. In that con-
text, all can benefit from a clear set of international 
rules and procedures that force holdout creditors to 
accept the terms of debt restructuring, impose stays 
on litigation during restructuring negotiations, and 
perhaps outline provisions for the extension of new 
credits during restructuring exercises. Of course, 
debtors can unilaterally prevent rushes to the exit by 
introducing exchange controls and can set the terms 
of debt restructuring through unilateral debt write-
downs. But the experiences of the 1930s and more 
recently of Argentina show that debtors undertaking 
these actions on their own face the threat of creditor 
retaliation and litigation, as well as damage to their 
reputation as a borrower. An international mecha-
nism that legitimizes and supports these actions will 
minimize these risks (Helleiner, 2008). 
These kinds of arguments have generated 
support for some kind of international bankruptcy 
mechanism, not just in the early 1940s, but also 
during 1980s’ debt crisis and, more recently, with 
the very detailed IMF proposals during 2001–2003 
for a “sovereign debt restructuring mechanism” 
(SDRM) (Rogoff and Zettlemeyer, 2002). As the 
IMF’s then senior Deputy Managing Director Anne 
Krueger (2001) put it in 2001, the absence of such a 
mechanism is a “gaping hole” in the governance of 
international finance. Although her proposed SDRM 
failed to gain enough support, it helped generate mo-
mentum for two more limited initiatives to address 
this issue after 2003. The first was the inclusion in 
all new international bond issues of collective action 
clauses (CACs) which allow for such provisions 
as altering repayment terms by a super majority of 
bondholders and restrictions on individual creditors 
from disrupting restructuring processes. 
The second was the creation of a set of volun-
tary international “principles” in 2004 to govern the 
behaviour of both debtor governments and private 
creditors relating to issues such as information shar-
ing, transparency, commitments to dialogue and 
cooperation, good faith actions in debt restructur-
ings, and equal treatment of all investors in cases 
of default (Helleiner, 2009b). These “Principles for 
Stable Capital Flows and Fair Debt Restructuring 
in Emerging Markets” were the product of negotia-
tions between a small group of developing countries 
(Brazil, Mexico, Turkey and the Republic of Korea) 
and private international financial interests, most 
notably the Institute of International Finance (IIF) 
which represents the world’s major international 
banks. They were welcomed by the G20 finance 
ministers and central bank governors at the time. The 
IIF subsequently established a “Group of Trustees” to 
review the implementation and further development 
of the Principles which includes senior representa-
tives of the private international financial sector as 
well as prominent officials and ex-officials from 
industrialized and emerging market countries. That 
Group provides guidance to a twenty-three member 
“Principles Consultative Group” (PCG) made up of 
senior private financial sector members and emerging 
market government officials (with the former in the 
majority), which evaluates individual country situ-
ations and provides advice to private creditors and 
governments about compliance with the Principles 
and any possible amendments to them. The PCG 
receives technical support from the IIF and includes, 
as observers, a representative of the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York and IMF staff (Principles Con-
sultative Group, 2008).
These initiatives represent an advance in the 
international regime for debt restructuring, but their 
limitations are likely to be exposed during the current 
crisis. Most CACs do not include aggregation provi-
sions for the terms of a country’s debt restructuring 
to be extended across all categories of bonds. CACs 
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rather are designed primarily only to facilitate the 
restructuring of sovereign debts after a crisis had 
broken out. In addition, CACs leave many of the key 
decisions concerning debt restructuring in the hands 
of private creditors, rather than allocating them to an 
independent arbiter or sharing power more equally 
with sovereign debtors in a formal institutional set-
ting. The dominant role of the private sector in the 
governance of the Principles is also open to criticism, 
as is their voluntary nature and ambiguous content 
in many areas (Herman, 2008). Finally, neither 
CACs nor the Principles include commitments of 
the kind recently endorsed in the December 2008 
Doha Declaration from the follow-up conference to 
the 2002 Monterrey summit. The declaration stated 
that the objectives of debt resolution must include 
“furthering development” and “taking into account 
debtors’ national policies and strategies linked to 
attaining the internationally agreed development 
goals, including the Millennium Development Goals” 
(United Nations, 2008). The current moment offers 
an opportunity to try to address these various issues 
(see also Herman, 2008).
The other development issue raised during 
the Bretton Woods preparations that deserves more 
attention today is the regulation of capital flight. 
Estimates of the size of capital flight from develop-
ing countries vary considerably, but for many of the 
poorest debtor countries, the private assets of their 
wealthy citizens abroad surpass the size of their of-
ficial debt. In other words, these countries are often 
creditors to the world at the very time they experience 
sovereign debt crises.2 If this private capital could 
be brought home – or discouraged from leaving in 
the first place – the development prospects of these 
countries would be enormously improved. Some 
argue that flight capital can only be stopped by chang-
ing the afflicted countries’ economic policies such as 
overvalued exchange rates or inflationary monetary 
policies. This view, however, ignores the extent to 
which capital flight may be related to other factors 
such as tax evasion, political instability or corruption. 
For these reasons, many analysts argue that capital 
controls have a role to play – usually alongside vari-
ous economic stabilization measures – in stemming 
capital flight. In many poor countries, however, the 
capacity of the state to enforce capital controls ef-
fectively is not very high.
Here is where the ideas of Keynes and White 
about the role of international cooperation in boosting 
the effectiveness of capital controls may be relevant. 
They noted how capital controls can be enforced 
more easily if recipient countries help by sharing 
information about foreign holdings, by directly as-
sisting efforts to repatriate funds, or even by blocking 
capital inflows in the first place. It is often forgotten 
that international cooperation of this kind was im-
plemented in a very modest way during the Marshall 
Plan when the United States assisted some European 
efforts to track flight capital in the United States by 
sharing information about these assets. The measure 
found particularly strong support among conservative 
and often isolationist members of Congress who saw 
the measure as a way to reduce the cost of the aid 
programme to United States taxpayers. The issue was 
also debated during the Latin American debt crisis 
of the 1980s when a number of observers suggested 
that the United States banks should be prompted to 
share information with Latin American governments 
about the assets of Latin America citizens they held 
as well as to refrain from soliciting flight capital from 
Latin America (Helleiner, 1995, 2001). 
A number of analysts have also raised the issue 
in the context of the increasingly extensive coopera-
tive efforts to control money laundering and terrorist 
finance. Financial institutions around the world are 
already forced to report all “suspicious” transac-
tions to domestic authorities and to refuse to engage 
in transactions where the identity of the customers 
involved is unknown. Governments have also de-
veloped extensive arrangements for international 
information sharing and legal cooperation which 
include commitments not to allow bank secrecy pro-
visions to interfere with these forms of international 
cooperation. As Karin Lissakers (1991: 158) noted 
as far back as 1991, “the potential of the new record-
keeping and client-identification requirements as a 
tool for tracking flight capital is obvious”.
This Bretton Woods moment should consider 
whether some kind of international cooperation stem-
ming capital flight could be embedded permanently 
within the international financial architecture. In their 
initial drafts, both Keynes and White had, in fact, 
intended international cooperation to control capital 
movements to be mandatory (Helleiner, 1994: ch. 2). 
Today, this could easily be accomplished by simply 
widening the definition of money laundering activi-
ties used by the international community to include 
capital flight (e.g. Sherman, 1993: 13). A limited 
move in this direction has come with the World 
Bank-United Nations Stolen Asset Recovery Initia-
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at their November 2008 summit. But the assets it 
targets make up only a small portion of flight capital. 
A more wide-ranging initiative would be in keeping 
with the initial ideas of Keynes and White. In this 
context, it is encouraging that the recent Doha follow-
up conference to Monterrey called for strengthening 
multilateral efforts to address capital flight (United 
Nations, 2008).
If wider initiatives involving permanent man-
datory cooperation were too ambitious, the idea 
could be implemented on a more temporary basis in 
the context of financial crisis management. When a 
crisis breaks out, the IMF could be empowered to 
require foreign governments to share information 
about capital flight from the crisis-hit country. This 
might appeal to developed countries if it reduced the 
potential costs of financial bailouts by slowing capital 
flight and by enabling the mobilization of existing 
flight capital. During the Marshall Plan era, a number 
of interesting proposals of this latter kind were con-
sidered by the United States government, including 
one IBRD proposal that would have seen a portion of 
the European flight capital invested in either United 
States or IBRD bonds with the proceeds used for aid 
or loans to European governments. During the 1980s’ 
debt crisis, proposals were also made to tax the inter-
est income earned by the United States deposits of 
Latin American citizens and to give the proceeds to 
the Inter-American Development Bank (Helleiner, 
1995; Williamson and Lessard, 1987). These efforts 
to recycle flight capital back to the original capital 
via international public lending echo the ideas that 
United States Treasury officials pioneered in the late 
1930s in developing the IAB initiative.
In addition to boosting resources available to 
debtor countries, this proposal might also have two 
other benefits. First, it would help spread the distri-
bution of the adjustment burden within the country 
experiencing a financial crisis in a more equitable 
fashion. When international creditors pressure debtor 
governments to assume the private foreign debt of 
their citizens as part of crisis-management proce-
dures, the burden of adjustment to private borrowing 
behaviour – usually that of more wealthy citizens – is 
shifted to the country as a whole. By mobilizing flight 
capital in crisis moments to help service the external 
debt of the country, the international community 
would ensure that wealthier citizens contributed 
more to the resolution of the crisis as well. Second, 
the existence of this kind of procedure at the interna-
tional level might also discourage flight capital in the 
future. At the moment, there are strong incentives for 
wealthy domestic asset holders in poorer countries 
to engage in capital flight at the first sign of an im-
pending crisis. Not only do they protect their money 
from a potential devaluation or imposition of capital 
controls in this way, but they also have the prospect 
of “round-tripping” the money after a devaluation to 
buy up domestic assets at bargain prices. If domestic 
asset holders were aware that their foreign assets 
might be mobilized for public purposes as part of a 
financial rescue plan, they might be less inclined to 
flee so quickly.
Iv.  conclusion
The G20 leaders’ summit in November 2008 
invariably invited comparisons with Bretton Woods. 
At both meetings there was a shared desire to assert 
public authority more centrally into the international 
financial system in the wake of a devastating interna-
tional financial crisis. But the G20 leaders have so far 
been much more cautious than their Bretton Woods 
predecessors in laying out an agenda to achieve this 
goal. This paper has suggested that the three broad 
innovations in global financial governance outlined 
at Bretton Woods may serve as useful road map if 
policymakers want to set their sights higher: the 
regulation of international financial markets, the 
management of global imbalances, and the promotion 
of international development.
Some of the specific long-forgotten propos-
als that were discussed during the Bretton Woods 
negotiations in each of these three categories also 
deserve reconsideration today, such as those relating 
to debt restructuring, heterodox financial advice for 
developing countries, and the role of international 
cooperation in efforts to control capital movements. 
This is not to suggest that history should simply 
repeat itself. If the Bretton Woods objectives are to 
be met in the contemporary context, a number of the 
proposals they discussed would need to be adjusted 
to the new economic and political circumstances. 
Efforts to regulate international financial markets 
today must go far beyond the border control issues 
addressed at Bretton Woods to strengthen interna-
tional prudential rules. For those wanting to curtail 
speculative international financial flows, the Tobin 
tax provides a new approach not considered at Bret-
ton Woods. With respect to the management of global 
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surplus and deficit countries have shared responsibili-
ties needs to be reinforced via new mechanisms such 
as an international substitution account, support for 
domestic currency borrowing in developing coun-
tries, and new kinds of reserve pooling arrangements 
at the global and regional levels. The promotion of 
international development must also be extended to 
cover the new international prudential regulations 
being developed. 
Important to all these areas is also the need for 
governance reform to adjust international financial in-
stitutions to today’s more decentralized international 
political environment. At the Bretton Woods confer-
ence, United States leadership within the multilateral 
Bretton Woods institutions was simply assumed. 
Today, the world is changing in ways that make 
governance questions a much more important part of 
the agenda of global financial reform. It is not just a 
question of giving developing countries more say in 
the Bretton Woods institutions as well as in the FSF 
and other standard-setting bodies. Also significant 
is the need to consider decentralizing international 
financial governance by assigning more tasks to the 
regional level. At the same time, greater resort to a 
principle of subsidiarity via regional arrangements in 
international financial governance must be grounded 
within the broad multilateral framework set not just 
by the Bretton Woods institutions, but also the United 
Nations system more generally. 
This last point deserves special emphasis for 
those seeking to build a new Bretton Woods. As we 
have seen, from the very start, United States policy-
makers in the early 1940s intended the planning for 
the post-war international financial order to be situ-
ated within the larger process of creating the United 
Nations system. It is no coincidence that the formal 
title of the Bretton Woods meeting was the “United 
Nations Monetary and Financial Conference”. In the 
lead-up to the conference, British policymakers had 
pressed at various moments for bilateral negotiations, 
but United States policymakers insisted on a more 
inclusive multilateral meeting which included not just 
smaller industrialized countries, but also countries 
from the non-industrialized world (Helleiner, 2006). 
In the contemporary period, the United States deci-
sion to create a summit of the G20 leaders for the first 
time in November 2008 marked an important effort to 
be more inclusive of emerging powers in discussions 
of global financial reform. If the goal is to build a 
new Bretton Woods order, however, the process will 
need to be embedded within a more representative, 
inclusive and universal political framework.
Notes
 1  Beyond Latin America, other non-industrialized countries 
from outside Europe that were represented at the confer-
ence included: China, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, 
Liberia, the Philippines, South Africa.
 2  See, for example, Ndikumana and Boyce (2008). Variations 
in estimates partly reflect different definitions that are used. 
The most recent estimate comes from Kar and Cartwright-
Smith (2009) who suggests that “illicit capital flight” from 
developing countries was between $850–1,000 billion in 
2006. They define capital flight as “capital that is illegally 
earned, transferred, or utilized and covers all unrecorded 
private financial outflows that drive the accumulation of 
foreign assets by residents in contravention of applicable 
laws and the regulatory framework”.
References 
Bergsten F (2007). How to Solve the Problem of the Dollar. 
Financial Times. 11 December. 
Bordo M and James H (2008). The Fund Must Be Global Asset 
Manager. Financial Times. 21 October.
Borgwardt E (2005). A New Deal for the World. Cambridge, MA, 
Harvard University Press.
Cooper R (1994). What Future for the International Monetary 
System? In: Siklos P, ed. Varieties of Monetary Reforms. 
London, Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Dosman E (2008). The Life and Times of Raúl Prebisch, 1901–
1986. Montreal, McGill-Queen’s University Press.
Eckes A (1975). A Search for Solvency: Bretton Woods and 
the International Monetary System, 1941–1971. Austin, 
University of Texas Press.
Gardner R (1980). Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy in Current Per-
spective. New York, Columbia University Press.
Gold J (1971). ‘To Contribute Thereby To…Development…’: 
Aspects of the Relations of the International Monetary 
Fund with its Developing Members. Columbia Journal 
of Transnational Law 10 (2): 267–302.
Gowa J (1984). Hegemons, International Organizations, and 
Markets: The Case of the Substitution Account. Interna-
tional Organization. 38 (4): 661–683.
Guha K (2008). Wealth Funds Urged to Invest in Africa. Finan-
cial Times. 3 April. 
G20 (2008). Declaration of the summit on Financial Markets 
and the World Economy. Washington, DC. 15 November. 
Available at http: //www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/finan-
cialmarkets/. 
Helleiner E (1994). States and the Reemergence of Global Fi-
nance. Ithaca, Cornell University Press.
Helleiner E (1995). Handling ‘Hot Money’: US Policy Towards 
Latin American Capital Flight in Historical Perspective. 
Alternatives 20: 81–110.17 The Contemporary Reform of Global Financial Governance: Implications of and Lessons from the Past
Helleiner E (2001). Regulating Capital Flight. Challenge 44 (1): 
19–34.
Helleiner E (2006). Reinterpreting Bretton Woods: International 
Development and the Neglected Origins of Embedded 
Liberalism. Development and Change 37 (5): 943–967.
Helleiner E (2008). The Mystery of the Missing Sovereign Debt 
Restructuring Mechanism. Contributions to Political 
Economy 27 (1): 91–113.
Helleiner E (2009a). Central Bankers as Good Neighbors: US 
Money Doctors in Latin America During the 1940s. Finan-
cial History Review 16 (1): 1–21.
Helleiner E (2009b). Filling a Hole in Global Financial Govern-
ance? The Politics of Regulating Sovereign Bond Restruc-
turing. In: Mattli W and Woods N, eds. The Politics of Glo-
bal Regulation. Princeton, Princeton University Press.
Helleiner E (2009c). The Development Mandate of International 
Institutions: Where Did It Come From? Studies in Com-
parative and International Development 44 (3).
Helleiner E and Pagliari S (2009). Towards a New Bretton 
Woods? The First G20 Leaders Summit and the Regulation 
of Global Finance. New Political Economy 14 (2).
Herman B (2008). Why the Code of Conduct for Resolving Debt 
Crises Falls Short. Working Paper Series. Initiative for Poli-
cy Dialogue, Columbia University. New York. February.
Horsefield J (1969). The International Monetary Fund 1945–1965: 
Twenty years of International Monetary Cooperation – 
Volume 1. Washington, DC, International Monetary Fund. 
Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy (2009). Betting Against 
Food Security. Minneapolis, MN. January. http: //www.
iatp.org/iatp/publications.cfm?refid=105065.
Kapur D, Lewis J and Webb R (1997). The World Bank: Its First 
Half Century. Washington, DC, Brookings.
Kar D and Cartwright-Smith D (2009). Illicit Financial Flows 
from Developing Countries, 2002–06. Global Financial 
Integrity. Washington, DC.
Kenen P (2005). Stabilizing the International Monetary System. 
Journal of Policy Modeling 27: 487–493.
Krueger A (2001). International Financial Architecture for 
2002: A New Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring. 
Address given at the National Economists’ Club Annual 
Members’ Dinner, American Enterprise Institute. Wash-
ington, DC. 26 November. Available at: http: //www.imf.
org/external/np/speeches/2001/112601.htm.
League of Nations (1920). International Financial Conference, 
1920, Vol.1. The Dewarichet, Brussels.
Lissakers K (1991). Banks, Borrowers and the Establishment. 
New York, Basic Books.
Meier G (1984). The Formative Period. In: Meier G and Seers D, 
eds. Pioneers in Development. Oxford, Oxford University 
Press.
Mistry P (1999). Coping with Financial Crises: Are Regional 
Arrangements the Missing Link? In: International Mon-
etary and Financial Issues for the 1990s. Vol. X. United 
Nations publication. Sales No. E.99.II.D.14. New York 
and Geneva: 93–116.
Ndikumana L and Boyce J (2008). Capital Flight from Sub-Saharan 
Africa. Tax Justice Focus 4(1): 5–6. Political Economy 
Research Institute (PERI), University of Massachusetts, 
Amherst.
Oliver R (1975). International Economic Co-operation and the 
World Bank. London, Macmillan. 
Principles Consultative Group (2008). Report on Implementation 
by the Principles Consultative Group. Washington, DC, 
Institute of International Finance. October.
Reinhart C and Rogoff K (2008). Is the 2007 US Financial Crisis 
So Different? An International Historical Comparison. 
American Economic Review 98 (2): 339–344.
Reuters (2008). Dollar Crisis Looms, says Nobel Laureate Mun-
dell. Reuters News Agency. 3 June.
Rodrik D and Subramanian A (2008). Why We Need to Curb 
Global Flows of Capital. Financial Times, 26 February.
Rodrik D (2009). Let Developing Nations Rule. Vox, 28 January 
http: //www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/2885.
Rogoff K and Zettelmeyer J(2002). Bankruptcy Procedures for 
Sovereigns: A History of Ideas, 1976–2001. IMF Staff 
Papers 49(3): 470–507.
Schmidt, Rodney (2007). The Currency Transaction Tax: Rate 
and Revenue Estimates. Ottawa: North-South Institute.
Sherman T (1993). International Efforts to Combat Money 
Laundering: The Role of the Financial Action Task Force. 
In David Hume Institute. Money Laundering. Edinburgh, 
Edinburgh University Press.
South Centre (2008). Calls for Revamping the Global Financial 
Architecture. Statement by Board Members of. the South 
Centre. South Centre, Geneva. 29 October. http: //www.
southcentre.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=v
iew&id=871&Itemid=1.
Staples A (2006). The Birth of Development. Kent, Kent State 
University Press.
Tobin J (1978). A Proposal for International Monetary Reform. 
Eastern Economic Journal 4: 153–159.
Ul Haq M, Grunberg I and Kaul I, eds. (1996). The Tobin Tax. 
New York, Oxford University Press. 
United Nations (2008). Doha Declaration on Financing for 
Development. New York. 2 December.
Van Dormael, A (1978). Bretton Woods: Birth of a Monetary 
System. London: Macmillan.
Williamson J and Lessard D, eds. (1987). Capital Flight and 
Third World Debt. Washington, DC, Institute for Interna-
tional Economics.
Wolf M (2008). Fixing Global Finance. Baltimore: Johns Hop-
kins University Press.
Wolf M (2009). Why President Obama must mend a sick world 
economy. Financial Times, 21 January. 18 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 55
No. 54  February 2009  Gerald EPSTEIN  Post-war Experiences with Developmental Central Banks: 
The Good, the Bad and the Hopeful
No. 53  December 2008  Frank ACKERMAN  Carbon Markets and Beyond: The Limited Role of 
Prices and Taxes in Climate and Development Policy
No. 52  November 2008  C.P. CHANDRASEKHAR  Global Liquidity and Financial Flows to Developing 
Countries: New Trends in Emerging Markets and their 
Implications
No. 51  September 2008  Ugo PANIZZA  The External Debt Contentious Six Years after the Monter-
rey Consensus
No. 50  July 2008  Stephany GRIFFITH-JONES  Enhancing the Role of Regional Development Banks
     with David GRIFFITH-JONES 
      and Dagmar HERTOVA
No. 49  December 2007  David WOODWARD  IMF Voting Reform: Need, Opportunity and Options
No. 48  November 2007  Sam LAIRD  Aid for Trade: Cool Aid or Kool-Aid
No. 47  October 2007  Jan KREGEL  IMF Contingency Financing for Middle-Income Countries 
with Access to Private Capital Markets: An Assessment of 
the Proposal to Create a Reserve Augmentation Line
No. 46  September 2007  José María FANELLI  Regional Arrangements to Support Growth and Macro-
Policy Coordination in MERCOSUR
No. 45  April 2007  Sheila PAGE  The Potential Impact of the Aid for Trade Initiative
No. 44  March 2007  Injoo SOHN  East Asia’s Counterweight Strategy: Asian Financial 
Cooperation and Evolving International Monetary Order
No. 43  February 2007  Devesh KAPUR and  Beyond the IMF
      Richard WEBB 
No. 42  November 2006  Mushtaq H. KHAN   Governance and Anti-Corruption Reforms in Developing 
Countries: Policies, Evidence and Ways Forward 
No. 41  October 2006  Fernando LORENZO   IMF Policies for Financial Crises Prevention in
      and Nelson NOYA    Emerging Markets
No. 40  May 2006  Lucio SIMPSON  The Role of the IMF in Debt Restructurings: Lending Into 
Arrears, Moral Hazard and Sustainability Concerns
No. 39  February 2006  Ricardo GOTTSCHALK   East Asia’s Growing Demand for Primary Commodities
      and Daniela PRATES  – Macroeconomic Challenges for Latin America
No. 38  November 2005  Yilmaz AKYüZ  Reforming the IMF: Back to the Drawing Board
No. 37  April 2005  Colin I. BRADFORD, Jr.  Prioritizing Economic Growth: Enhancing  
Macro  economic Policy Choice
No. 36  March 2005  JOMO K.S.  Malaysia’s September 1998 Controls: Background, Context, 
Impacts, Comparisons, Implications, Lessons
No. 35  January 2005  Omotunde E.G. JOHNSON  Country Ownership of Reform Programmes and the  
Implications for Conditionality 
No. 34  January 2005  Randall DODD and   Up From Sin: A Portfolio Approach to Financial
       Shari SPIEGEL  Salvation
No. 33  November 2004  Ilene GRABEL  Trip Wires and Speed Bumps:  Managing Financial 
Risks and Reducing the Potential for Financial Crises in 
Developing Economies
No. 32  October 2004  Jan KREGEL  External Financing for Development and International 
Financial Instability 
No. 31  October 2004  Tim KESSLER and  Assessing the Risks in the Private Provision of 
      Nancy ALEXANDER  Essential Services
No. 30  June 2004  Andrew CORNFORD  Enron and Internationally Agreed Principles for Corporate 
Governance and the Financial Sector
No. 29  April 2004  Devesh KAPUR  Remittances: The  New Development Mantra? 
G-24 Discussion Paper Series*
Research papers for the Intergovernmental Group of Twenty-Four on International Monetary Affairs and Development19 The Contemporary Reform of Global Financial Governance: Implications of and Lessons from the Past
*  G-24 Discussion Paper Series are available on the website at: www.unctad.org. Copies of G-24 Discussion Paper Series 
may be obtained from the Publications Assistant, Macroeconomic and Development Policies Branch, Division on Globalization and 
Development Strategies, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Palais des Nations, CH-1211 Geneva 10, 
Switzerland; Fax (+41-22) 917.0274.
No. 28  April 2004  Sanjaya LALL  Reinventing Industrial Strategy: The Role of Govern-
ment Policy in Building Industrial Competitiveness 
No. 27  March 2004  Gerald EPSTEIN,   Capital Management Techniques in Developing 
      Ilene GRABEL   Countries: An Assessment of Experiences from the
      and JOMO, K.S.  1990s and Lessons for the Future
No. 26  March 2004  Claudio M. LOSER  External Debt Sustainability: Guidelines for Low- and 
Middle-income Countries
No. 25  January 2004  Irfan ul HAQUE  Commodities under Neoliberalism: The Case of Cocoa
No. 24  December 2003  Aziz Ali MOHAMMED  Burden Sharing at the IMF 
No. 23  November 2003  Mari PANGESTU   The Indonesian Bank Crisis and Restructuring: Lessons and 
Implications for other Developing Countries
No. 22  August 2003  Ariel BUIRA  An Analysis of IMF Conditionality
No. 21  April 2003  Jim LEVINSOHN  The World Bank’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 
Approach: Good Marketing or Good Policy?
No. 20  February 2003  Devesh KAPUR  Do As I Say Not As I Do: A Critique of G-7 Proposals 
on Reforming the Multilateral Development Banks
No. 19   December 2002  Ravi KANBUR  International Financial Institutions and International  Public 
Goods: Operational Implications for the World  Bank 
No. 18  September 2002  Ajit SINGH  Competition and Competition Policy in Emerging   
Markets: International and Developmental Dimensions
No. 17  April 2002  F. LóPEZ-DE-SILANES  The Politics of Legal Reform 
No. 16  January 2002  Gerardo ESQUIVEL and  The Impact of G-3 Exchange Rate Volatility on 
      Felipe LARRAíN B.  Developing Countries
No. 15  December 2001  Peter EVANS and   Organizational Reform and the Expansion  
      Martha FINNEMORE  of the South’s Voice at the Fund
No. 14  September 2001  Charles WYPLOSZ  How Risky is Financial Liberalization in the  
Developing Countries? 
No. 13  July 2001  José Antonio OCAMPO  Recasting the International Financial Agenda 
No.  12  July 2001  Yung Chul PARK and   Reform of the International Financial System and
      Yunjong WANG  Institutions in Light of the Asian Financial Crisis
No. 11  April 2001  Aziz Ali MOHAMMED  The Future Role of the International Monetary Fund
No. 10  March 2001  JOMO K.S.  Growth After the Asian Crisis: What Remains of the East 
Asian Model?
No.  9  February 2001  Gordon H. HANSON  Should Countries Promote Foreign Direct Investment?
No.  8  January 2001  Ilan GOLDFAJN and  Can Flexible Exchange Rates Still “Work” in 
      Gino OLIVARES  Financially Open Economies?
No.  7  December 2000  Andrew CORNFORD  Commentary on the Financial Stability Forum’s Report of 
the Working Group on Capital Flows
No.  6  August 2000  Devesh KAPUR and  Governance-related Conditionalities of the International 
      Richard WEBB  Financial Institutions
No.  5  June 2000  Andrés VELASCO  Exchange-rate Policies for Developing Countries: What 
Have We Learned?  What Do We Still Not Know?
No.  4  June 2000  Katharina PISTOR  The Standardization of Law and Its Effect on Developing 
Economies
No.  3  May 2000  Andrew CORNFORD  The Basle Committee’s Proposals for Revised Capital 
Standards: Rationale, Design and Possible Incidence
No.  2  May 2000  T. Ademola OYEJIDE  Interests and Options of Developing and Least-devel-
oped Countries in a New Round of Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations
No.  1  March 2000  Arvind PANAGARIYA  The Millennium Round and Developing Countries:   
Negotiating Strategies and Areas of Benefits  